Persuasion and learning by countersignaling |
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Authors: | Kim-Sau Chung Péter Es? |
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Institution: | 1. Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, 4-101 Hanson Hall, 1925 4th Street South, Minneapolis, MN 55455-0462, USA;2. Department of Economics, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, Hong Kong;3. Department of Economics, University of Oxford, Manor Road Building, Manor Road, Oxford, OX1 3UQ, United Kingdom |
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Abstract: | We model countersignaling (i.e., very high types refraining from signaling) arising from the tradeoff between persuasion and learning in a signaling game. We assume that the agent has imperfect private information regarding his/her productivity, which the signaling action provides additional verifiable information about. A higher-type agent benefits more from providing such objective, albeit imprecise, “proof” for the market, but may also gain less from learning about his/her productivity. When the latter effect dominates the former for the very high types, the equilibrium exhibits countersignaling: very high and low types pool on refraining from signaling, and only the medium types signal. Under certain conditions, the countersignaling equilibrium is the unique pure-strategy perfect sequential equilibrium. |
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Keywords: | D82 D86 |
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