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管理层业绩报酬敏感度、内部现金流与企业投资行为——对自由现金流和信息不对称理论的一个检验
引用本文:支晓强,童盼. 管理层业绩报酬敏感度、内部现金流与企业投资行为——对自由现金流和信息不对称理论的一个检验[J]. 会计研究, 2007, 0(10): 73-81
作者姓名:支晓强  童盼
作者单位:1. 中国人民大学商学院,100872
2. 北京工商大学会计学院,100037
摘    要:本文考察了业绩报酬敏感度对企业内部现金流与投资行为之间关系的影响。文章发现投资现金流敏感度不仅受到内外部信息不对称导致的融资约束的影响,而且受到了股东-经理代理问题的影响,但是信息不对称理论的解释力度相对较强。另外,投资现金流敏感度和管理层业绩报酬敏感度之间的关系受到公司控股股东所有权性质的影响。

关 键 词:业绩报酬敏感度  投资现金流敏感度  自由现金流  信息不对称

Management Team Pay-performance Sensitivity, Internal Cash Flow and Investment Behavior:a Test of Free Cash Flow and Asymmetric Information Theory
Zhi Xiaoqiang,Tong Pan. Management Team Pay-performance Sensitivity, Internal Cash Flow and Investment Behavior:a Test of Free Cash Flow and Asymmetric Information Theory[J]. Accounting Research, 2007, 0(10): 73-81
Authors:Zhi Xiaoqiang  Tong Pan
Abstract:We examine the influence of pay-performance sensitivity on the relation between internal cash flow and investment.We find that investment-cash flow sensitivity is not only affected by financial constraints that caused by asymmetric information,but also affected by shareholder-manager agency problem.And we find asymmetric information theory have more explaining power.We also find that the relation between investment-cash flow sensitivity and pay-performance sensitivity is affected by the nature of controlling shareholder ownership.
Keywords:
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