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Capital budgeting implications arising from locus of hotel owner/operator power |
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| Institution: | 1. Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Limpopo, Private Bag X1106, Sovenga 0727, South Africa;2. Environmental Economics and Natural Resources Group, Wageningen University, P.O. Box 8130, 6700 EW Wageningen, The Netherlands;1. Ibbotson Associates Japan, Inc. 6F Hibiya Building, 1-1-1 Shimbashi, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 105-0004, Japan;2. Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National University and Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI), 132 Lennox Crossing, ANU, Acton, ACT 2601, Australia;3. Faculty of Economics, Gakushuin University, 1-5-1 Mejiro, Toshima-ku, Tokyo, 171-8588, Japan |
| Abstract: | The findings of a study concerned with the locus of power between hotel owners and operators in Australia and New Zealand with hotels operated via a management contract are reported. Hypotheses are developed and tested in relation to the potential of locus of power to be associated with capital budgeting procedures. Using questionnaire survey data, support has been provided for the view that greater owner power is associated with: greater owner involvement in the capital budgeting process; greater emphasis on financial analytical tools in capital budgeting; and operators experiencing greater difficulty in securing a release of funds from the furniture, fixture and equipment reserve. |
| Keywords: | Agency relationship Capital budgeting FF&E reserve Hotel management contract Nonfinancial Power |
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