Managerial incentives and the decision to hire managers in markets with public and private firms |
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| Authors: | Mark D. White |
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| Affiliation: | Department of Political Science, Economics, and Philosophy, College of Staten Island/CUNY, 2800 Victory Boulevard, Staten Island, NY 10314, USA |
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| Abstract: | This paper considers the managerial incentive contract when public and private firms compete in the same market. Social welfare is enhanced when all firms hire managers, but for different reasons than when all firms are privately owned. Incentives to hire managers differ in private and public firms; in equilibrium, only private firms hire managers. |
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| Keywords: | Mixed oligopoly Public enterprise Managerial incentive contracts |
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