Yardstick competition to tame the Leviathan |
| |
Authors: | Matthias Wrede |
| |
Affiliation: | Department of Economics, Aachen University of Technology, D-52056 Aachen, Germany |
| |
Abstract: | This papers analyzes the disciplining role of elections under asymmetric information, when voters can rely on relative performance evaluation to tame a Leviathan. When elections are held in different regions, voters are able to reduce political rents below the Leviathan level by retrospective voting strategies. The paper compares a multi-candidate model with a two-party system with either independent or coordinated policies in the various jurisdictions. In general, voters prefer the multi-candidate system. However, the disciplining ability of voters under the two-party system is strengthened if each party has a uniform leadership that determines policies in all regions. |
| |
Keywords: | Voting theory Decentralization Yardstick competition Party system |
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录! |
|