激励扭曲下的管理层收购

传统观点认为国有企业绩效下降后的管理层收购是明晰企业产权,从根本上改善企业经营绩效的理性改革。本文分析指出,实践过程中供求双方激励扭曲下的管理层收购反而是导致20世纪90年代中后期以来国有企业绩效下降的重要原因。从需求角度而言,攫取由双边垄断的交易结构和以净资产价值为基础的交易价格共同形成的巨额“交易利润”是管理层收购国有企业的主要动力;从供给角度而言,预算约束硬化下以财政收入最大化为目标的各级政府总是存在卖出亏损或绩差国有企业的积极性。均衡分析表明:在法制和资本市场不完善时期,管理层通过关联交易、操纵项目投资和财务报表等灰色方式制造企业绩效恶化的假象,却可能无损于企业真实绩效;而随着法制和资本市场的逐步完善,使企业绩效真正地变差反而可能是管理层的最优选择。

Management Buyouts with Distorted Motivation:A New Explanation to SOEs' Performance Deterioration

Management buyouts are generally looked as rational reactions to State-Owned Enterprises' inefficiency. This paper applied a management buyouts hypothesis with distorted motivation and argued that management buyouts may be a big factor in causing performance deterioration of State-Owned Enterprises from middle of 1990s. The paper distinguished fictitious and actual deterioration and said that management would choose writing down SOEs' book value instead of destroying their actual performance under low-level developed legal system and capital market, but SOEs' actual performance would be damaged artificially when legal system and capital market were better structured.