An investment contest to influence environmental policy |
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Authors: | Bouwe R Dijkstra |
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Institution: | aSchool of Economics and GEP, University of Nottingham, Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK |
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Abstract: | In an investment contest for environmental policy, polluters and victims of pollution invest in an increase of their marginal benefits of pollution and environmental quality, respectively. These investments influence time-consistent environmental policy. Investments will exceed their optimal level. The more victims there are, the lower aggregate investment, the lower payoffs for the victims and the higher payoffs for the polluters. The more polluters there are, the higher aggregate investment and the lower payoffs for polluters and victims. Asymmetries between polluter and victim result in less overinvestment and bias environmental policy in favour of the less productive side. |
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Keywords: | Contest Environmental policy Time consistency Coordination |
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