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银行规模、俘获行为与监管者声誉关系研究
引用本文:刘江会,刘兴堂.银行规模、俘获行为与监管者声誉关系研究[J].江西财经大学学报,2011(5).
作者姓名:刘江会  刘兴堂
作者单位:1. 上海师范大学商学院,上海,200234
2. 新世纪资信评估投资服务有限公司,上海,200346
基金项目:上海市哲学社会科学基金(2005BJL008); 上海市教委科研创新项目(08YS76)
摘    要:通过构建银行俘获—监管者声誉模型研究我国银行俘获行为和监管者声誉问题,理论模型的分析表明:在市场集中度较高的银行体系中,具有市场势力的大银行,更有动机和能力俘获金融监管者,并造成了监管者声誉的持续缺失。基于这一理论,本文多角度实证分析了我国银行业的监管俘获和监管者声誉问题,研究结果发现:我国银行监管者不但存在被俘获的现象,而且监管者一旦选择了屈服,其强硬声誉便会丧失,从而损害监管绩效。在此基础上,提出了强化我国金融监管者声誉、约束银行俘获行为、提升金融监管绩效的相关政策建议。

关 键 词:银行规模  俘获行为  监管者声誉  监管绩效  

An Analysis of the Relationship between Bank Size,Capturing Behavior and Regulator's Reputation
LIU Jiang-hui,LIU Xing-tang.An Analysis of the Relationship between Bank Size,Capturing Behavior and Regulator's Reputation[J].Journal of Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics,2011(5).
Authors:LIU Jiang-hui  LIU Xing-tang
Institution:LIU Jiang-hui1,LIU Xing-tang2(1.Shanghai Normal University,Shanghai 200234,2.Shanghai Brilliance Credit Rating and Investors Service Co.,Ltd,Shanghai 200346,China)
Abstract:By building a bank capturing regulator's reputation model,this paper tries to study such issues as the capturing behavior and the regulator's reputation in China's banks.The analysis of the theoretical model indicates that in the banking system with a high degree of market concentration,large banks with market forces have more motivation and ability to capture the financial regulators,which results in the continued absence of the regulator's reputation.Based on this theory,this paper carries out an empirica...
Keywords:bank size  capturing behavior  regulator's reputation  regulatory performance  
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