Disclosure and agency conflict: Evidence from mutual fund commission bundling |
| |
Authors: | Roger M EdelenRichard B Evans Gregory B Kadlec |
| |
Institution: | a Graduate School of Management, University of California, Davis, CA 95616, United States b Darden School of Business, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22906, United States c Pamplin College of Business, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA 24060, United States |
| |
Abstract: | This study provides empirical evidence on the role of disclosure in resolving agency conflicts in delegated investment management. For certain expenditures, fund managers have alternative means of payment which differ greatly in their opacity: payments can be expensed (relatively transparent); or bundled with brokerage commissions (relatively opaque). We find that the return impact of opaque payments is significantly more negative than that of transparent payments. Moreover, we find a differential flow reaction that confirms the opacity of commission bundling. Collectively, our results demonstrate the importance of transparency in addressing agency costs of delegated investment management. |
| |
Keywords: | G20 G24 G28 |
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录! |
|