基于协同治理视角的上市公司会计信息披露的演化博弈与实证

上市公司会计信息披露是企业向政府和社会公众传递企业自身财务经营等会计信息情况的重要途径，是证券市场赖以生存的基础之一。对会计信息披露有效和准确的监管保证了真实准确和完整规范的会计信息在市场中有效传递，进而保障了证券市场的良性运行。本文通过构建监管部门、上市公司和公众在会计信息披露监管中的演化博弈模型并用计量模型进行检验，厘清三者利益和行为的相互作用关系，探究监管部门的监管选择。研究表明，监管部门对上市公司监管水平受上市公司信息披露质量和公众监督的影响，应提高监管水平、加大处罚力度，对上市公司分类、精准监管，同时保证公众监督的权利才能达到更好地协同治理成效。

The Evolutionary Game and Demonstration of Accounting Information Disclosure of Listed Companies Based on the Perspective of Collaborative Governance

The accounting information disclosure of listed companies is an important way for enterprises to transmit accounting information such as their own financial operations to the government and the public, and it is one of the foundations for the survival of the securities market. The effective and accurate supervision of accounting information disclosure ensures the effective transmission of true, accurate, complete and standardized accounting information in the market, thereby ensuring the healthy operation of the securities market. This paper constructs an evolutionary game model among regulatory authorities, listed companies and the public in the regulation of accounting information disclosure and tests it with an econometric model to clarify the interaction between the interests and behaviors of the three, and to explore the regulatory options of the regulatory authorities. The research shows that the level of supervision of listed companies by the regulatory authorities is affected by the quality of information disclosure of listed companies and public supervision. It is necessary to improve the level of supervision, increase the severity of punishment, classify and precisely supervise listed companies, and at the same time ensure the right of public supervision to achieve better results. collaborative governance effectiveness.