Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for pure public goods economies when preferences are monotonic |
| |
Authors: | Diego Moreno |
| |
Institution: | (1) Departamento de Economía, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, E-28903 Getafe, SPAIN (e-mail:dmoreno@eco. uc3m.es), ES |
| |
Abstract: | Summary. A fundamental problem in public finance is that of allocating a␣given budget to financing the provision of public goods (education,
transportation, police, etc.). In this paper it is established that when␣admissible preferences are those representable by
continuous and increasing utility functions, then strategy-proof allocation mechanisms whose (undominated) range contains three or more outcomes are
dictatorial on the set of profiles of strictly increasing utility functions, a dense subset of the domain in the topologies commonly used in this context. If admissible utility functions
are further restricted to be strictly increasing, or if mechanisms are required to be non-wasteful, then strategy-profness
leads to (full) dictatorship.
Received: August 14, 1995; revised version: September 25, 1997 |
| |
Keywords: | JEL Classification Numbers: D60 D70 H40 |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|