| 上市公司高管股权激励动态博弈 |
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| 引用本文： | 陈远志,谢平洋.上市公司高管股权激励动态博弈[J].价值工程,2013(33):124-126. |
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| 作者姓名： | 陈远志 谢平洋 |
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| 作者单位： | 华南理工大学工商管理学院,广州510640 |
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| 摘 要： | 运用博弈论基本原理对上市公司高管的股权激励机制进行了分析,探讨了公司产出与高管的努力程度之间的关系,对股东对高管进行股权激励时的股权比例、股票行权价值等变量的选择进行研究,并针对给高管股权激励现状提出建议。
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| 关 键 词： | 上市公司 高管 股权激励 博弈 |
A Dynamic Game of Executive Equity Incentive in Listed Companies |
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| Institution: | ( School of Business Administration, South China University of Technology, Guangzhou 510640, China ) |
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| Abstract: | By applying the principles of game theories, I analyze the mechanism of equity incentive in listed companies, trying to detect the relationship between corporate output and the extent of executives＂ exertion and dig into some variables, like the shareholding proportion and exercise price etc. Then I will describe the status quo of equity incentive in China and provide suggestions on improving it further. |
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| Keywords: | listed companies executives equity incentive a dynamic game |
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