控股股东控制、管理层激励与公司过度投资

本文基于我国上市公司大小股东间严重代理冲突、控股股东政府性质，以及股权分置改革的制度背景，从公司过度投资的视角对管理层激励效应进行理论分析，并以2004-2009年上市公司为样本，检验了控股股东两权分离程度及其性质对于管理层激励抑制过度投资效应的影响。研究发现，不论是货币薪酬激励还是管理层持股激励都起到了抑制过度投资的作用，但上市公司控股股东的两权分离程度会削弱管理层激励的这种治理效应；而且，公司的政府控制性质在弱化管理层激励抑制过度投资作用的同时，还会强化控股股东两权分离对管理层激励效应的负面影响。考虑股权分置改革影响的进一步研究表明，股改强化了管理层激励对于公司过度投资的抑制作用，同时又弱化了控股股东的两权分离对管理层激励治理效应的负面影响。研究结果不仅为现有文献关于管理层激励与企业绩效关联的结论分歧提供新的解释，对于理解我国上市公司管理层激励的有效性，以及切实改进管理层激励契约等，具有重要参考价值，同时也从新的视角为我国股改的有效性提供了证据。

Controlling Shareholders Control,Management Incentive and Corporate Over-investment

Based on the institutional background of the serious agency conflicts between large and small shareholders, state-owned shareholder and ownership-split reform, this paper gives a theoretical analysis about the effect of management incentive from the perspective of over-investment, besides, using the data from 2004 to 2009 of Chinese listed companies as samples, we identify whether management incentive attenuates over-investment. The results show that both monetary and stock incentives can attenuate over-investment, but the separation of controlling right from cash flow right weakens this effect. The state-owned nature of controlling shareholders weakens the governance effect of management incentive on over-investment, and strengthens the negative influence of the separation of controlling right from cash flow right on management incentive effect. Further investigation indicates that ownership-split reform not only enhances the inhibition of management incentive on over-investment, but