农业企业制度效率的理论分析与实证检验

农业企业制度安排及其经济效率是经济运行中一个值得关注的问题。基于农业企业制度安排的现实，可以将农业企业合作生产和剩余分配的制度安排概括划分为固定工资契约制、分成地租契约制和固定地租契约制等三种形式。针对这三种形式，文章在运用逻辑推理、边际分析等方法进行理论分析的基础上，对这三种企业制度安排进行了历史考察、统计分析和实验检验，以说明和论证这三种企业制度安排的经济效率。文章认为，马歇尔税收等价理论和张五常佃农理论有关农业企业制度安排的研究并非完全对立，这两大理论可以在一定程度和范围内协调；关于这一协调，本文在垄断竞争市场的背景下，提出了融合这三种制度安排的激励效应理论，认为农业企业制度安排经过协调后会提升经济效率，并通过对农业企业的实证检验在理论分析层面证实了这一观点。

The Theoretical Analysis and Empirical Test of Institutional Efficiency in Agricultural Enterprises

The institutional arrangements and economic efficiency of agricultural enterprises is a problem worth our attention in economic operation. Based on the reality of institutional arrangements in agricultural enterprises, institutional arrangements of agricultural enterprises in cooperative production and residual assignment can be generally divided into three types as fixed wage contract, share tenancy contract and fixed rent contract. This paper conducted theoretical analysis by method of logical reasoning and marginal analysis method etc., carried on the historical inspection, statistical analysis and experimental verification on the three kinds of institutional arrangements of agricultural enterprises to explain and demonstrate the economic efficiency of the three institutional arrangements. The paper reveals that research on agricultural institutional arrangements of enterprises in the Marshall’s tax equivalent theory and Zhang Wuchang’s share tenancy theory is not completely opposite and the two theories can be coordinated in a certain degree and range; concerning the coordination between them, on the background of the monopolistic competition market, the paper puts forward the incentive effect theory which integrates the three institutional arrangements and argues if the institutional arrangements of agricultural enterprises are coordinated, the economic efficiency will be improved which is confirmed by the theoretical analysis of the empirical test of agricultural enterprise.