| 完全信息条件下企业内部知识共享激励机制研究 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 樊斌,鞠晓峰.完全信息条件下企业内部知识共享激励机制研究[J].商业研究,2010(11). |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 樊斌 鞠晓峰 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 1. 东北农业大学,经济管理学院,哈尔滨,150030
2. 哈尔滨工业大学,管理学院,哈尔滨,150001 |
| |
| 基金项目： | 黑龙江省教育厅人文社会科学项目;项目 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 基于委托代理理论和企业内部知识共享过程中所呈现的完全信息特征,构建了完全信息条件下企业内部知识共享多阶段激励机制模型。通过最优化一阶条件分别求解员工风险中性与风险规避时的最优激励机制,并分析最优激励机制的特点。研究结果表明:在完全信息条件下的企业内部知识共享过程中企业设计强制合同,帕累托最优合同可以实现,当员工为风险中性时,员工承担全部风险;当员工为风险规避时,员工不承担风险。
|
| 关 键 词： | 激励机制 知识共享 完全信息 委托代理理论 帕累托最优 |
Incentive Mechanism Research on Knowledge Sharing within Enterprise under Complete Information |
| |
| FAN Bin,JU Xiao-feng.Incentive Mechanism Research on Knowledge Sharing within Enterprise under Complete Information[J].Commercial Research,2010(11). |
| |
| Authors: | FAN Bin JU Xiao-feng |
| |
| Abstract: | According to principal-agent theory,complete information characteristics of knowledge sharing in enterprise,a multi-stages incentive mechanism model of knowledge sharing in enterprise under complete information is proposed. And then the optimal incentive mechanism and its characteristics are given by optimization first-order condition when employee is risk neutral or risk evadable. The results indicate that,in the process of knowledge sharing in enterprise under complete information,enterprise designs compulsive contract,Pareto optimality is reachable. When employ-ee is risk neutral,he takes all risk; when employee is risk evadable,he takes no risk. |
| |
| Keywords: | incentive mechanism knowledge sharing complete information principal -agent theory Pareto optimality |
| 本文献已被 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
|
