“默示同意”：合理博弈与不完善制度——郑百文重组过程中表决规则的经济学分析

当主持者对表决方式有选择余地时,那么他会根据自己的偏好,直接或间接影响表决结果,这是无法避免的,是在现有制度下的一种合理博弈,是有效的。如果他本身就是博弈的一方,则更会充分利用这种影响。而主持人对议案内容的偏好是广泛存在的,不可能通过消除偏好来消除影响。但是如果加强民主和监督,使主持者的选择余地尽可能缩小,即他只能选择社会承认的最优的“公平”规则才符合他自己的成本－－收益平衡,那么这样就使个人的最优选择与社会的最优选择一致,提供了制度上的改进办法。而在未有更高程度的民主和更有效的监督制度之前,只能容忍在现有制度内的博弈行为。所以,只有通过进一步加强民主和健全法制,进行表决规则的制度建设,才有可能得到更优化和更真实的表决结果。

"Tacit Approval":Rational Game and Imperfect Institution

It is unavoidable, a rational game under the present-day institutions, and thus valid, for a chairperson to have direct or indirect effect on a vote in light of his or her partiality, when he or she has room for choosing a vote form. He or she will make fuller use of the effect if he himself or she herself is one party of the game. And in general, a chairperson's partiality to the bill extensively exists, and it is not likely to eliminate the effect through removing the partiality. But if the democratic supervision is strengthened, the chairperson's choice margin will be reduced as much as possible. That is to say, only the choice of socially accepted, optimal "fair" rule is in conformity with his or her own cost-benefit equilibrium, gained will be the consensus between individual and social optimal choices, which provides institutionally the improving way. And before there are no higher democracy and more effective supervision mechanism, what we can only do is to tolerate the game conduct under the present-day institutions.Therefore, only through the strengthening of democracy, perfection of legal system, and the institutional establishment of rules for vote, can it be likely to get more optimal and more genuine vote result.