Information contents of collateral under heterogeneous borrower qualities on the bank loans market in China |
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Institution: | 1. School of Finance, Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing 100070, China;2. School of Economics and Finance (Albany), Massey University, Auckland 0745, New Zealand;3. Department of Economics, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843-4228, USA |
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Abstract: | We analyze the risk of default and provision of collateral for bank loans made to firms of varied credit qualities using a unique dataset obtained from a major state-owned commercial bank in China. Both high and low quality borrowers provide collateral more often than medium quality debtors do. Using models that explicitly incorporate heterogeneous borrower qualities, we find a positive relation between collateralization and risk of default for loans issued to debtors with low credit ratings. In contrast, collateral provided by debtors with high credit ratings is negatively associated with the risk of default. These results suggest that low quality borrowers may be required to provide collateral at the bank's request to mitigate moral hazard problem. On the other hand, high quality borrowers may provide collateral willingly to signal quality in order to mitigate adverse selection problem when competing for getting access to bank loans. Our findings shed new lights on different information contents of collateral on the bank loans market of China, and have important implications for banks in screening, contracting and monitoring the risk of commercial loans for clients with diverse credit qualities. |
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