Malice and patience in Rubinstein bargaining |
| |
Authors: | Brishti Guha |
| |
Institution: | Centre for International Trade and Development, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi 110067, India |
| |
Abstract: | If two players playing a Rubinstein alternating offers game are highly malicious (getting a high utility from “malice” in every period when the other player does not obtain a share in a fixed pie), and highly patient, no equilibrium with an agreement exists and players choose perpetual disagreement. This does not change if the players are subjected to a known deadline after which the pie will be appropriated by outside agencies or disappear: perpetual disagreement is still the only outcome. If in addition players are required to pay endogenously determined fines if they fail to reach agreement, players with discount factors in a certain range do reach agreement, but only at the deadline. However, infinitely patient players would never reach agreement for any feasible level of one-time fines. The result contrasts with spiteful or envious preferences. Our results highlight a novel reason for failure to resolve property disputes. |
| |
Keywords: | Malice Patience Rubinstein bargaining Deadlines C72 D91 |
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录! |
|