A Common Pool Resource Game with Sequential Decisions and Experimental Evidence |
| |
Authors: | Lluis Bru Susana Cabrera C Monica Capra Rosario Gomez |
| |
Institution: | (1) University of Málaga, Spain;(2) Washington and Lee University, Lexington, VA 24450, USA |
| |
Abstract: | We describe a common pool resource game in which players choose how much of the stock to extract in a sequential manner. There are two choices and one represents taking a larger proportion of the stock than the other. After a player makes a choice, the remaining stock grows at a constant rate. We consider a game with a finite number of alternating moves. It is shown that changes in the larger proportion of the stock that the players are allowed to take and the growth rate affect equilibrium, but have little effect on behavior in the laboratory. In addition to observing more cooperation than predicted, we observe that parameters that are strategically irrelevant affect behavior. The results of this research might help policy makers in developing adequate policies to prevent overexploitation of some natural renewable resources. |
| |
Keywords: | laboratory experiments common pool resources games |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |