基于政府间博弈竞争的越界流域水污染治理困境分析

论文基于政府间博弈竞争的分析框架,分析中央和地方政府间、同级地方政府间博弈竞争在越界流域水污染治理中的策略性行为,通过对双重博弈竞争模型均衡结果的分析,发现地方政府对辖区流域水污染治理的概率取决于中央政府的监管成本和处罚力度,而在缺乏有效监督和处罚的情况下,地方政府的"理性"选择是不治理,地方政府间的"囚徒困境"导致流域水污染越来越严重。首先,要构建强有力的流域组织协调机构;其次,要建立科学的地方政府绩效评估体系;第三,要构建流域水污染治理生态补偿机制。

An Analysis on the Conflicts Relating to Transboundary Water Pollution A Perspective of Games between Governments

Based on an analytical framework of inter-governmental competitive game, This Thesis aims to reveal the competition between central and local governments, or those local governments at the same level. Through the research of the equilibrium of double game competition model, this thesis proves that the efficiency of a local government's water pollution control depends on the supervision and punishment of the central government. When the supervision and punishment from above is absent, the "rational" option for the local government would be abstaining its environmental responsibilities. It is this Prisoner's Dilemma that caused the deterioration of water pollution. Approaches to resolve this dilemma would be: firstly, to construct an effective transboundary water pollution coordination mechanism; secondly, to set up a scientific evaluation system of local governments; thirdly, to establish an eco-compensation system.