中国金融体系的脆弱性与道德风险

道德风险行为就是当签约一方不完全承担风险后果时所采取的自身效用最大化的自私行为.中国金融体系存在严重的脆弱性,根本原因也在于道德风险.政府不仅对银行提供了担保,也认为证券市场"太大而不能失败".证券市场危机往往是金融危机的先行指标,随之而来的银行危机和货币危机将决定金融危机的深度和广度.中国金融体系的道德风险已经深入到最基层的代理人,其代价将是非常惨重的.

Moral Hazard and Fragility of China Financial System

In the information economics literature, a moral hazard problem exists when the agent's action is not verifiable, or when the agent receives private information after the relationship has been initiated. Similarly, but somewhat more formally, moral hazard is defined in the economics literature as: "actions by economic agents in maximizing their own utility to the detriment of others in situations where they do not bear the full consequences ... of their actions." Various economic models and hypotheses have been put forward to explain financial crises. Krugman's moral hazard argument emphasizes inefficiencies resulting from "long-lasting" government protection and intervention in the market mechanism. The implication of this argument is that government guarantee of financial intermediaries or corporations led them to undertake excessively risky investments and to pursue over investment, particularly in the boom period. Although China can avoid 1997 Asian Crisis, it does not mean China has strong financial system. Long-lasting government intervention in the allocation of financial resources distorted bank-corporation relationships and resulted in moral hazard in the banking and stock market sector. Government not only thinks banking sector is too big to fail, but also the stock market. Stock market crisis is advance pointer, along with banking crisis and money crisis. The government's guarantees may have good initial motives, but the results usually are not good.