The roles of reputation and transparency on the behavior of biased experts |
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Authors: | Sylvain Bourjade Bruno Jullien |
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Institution: | 1. Toulouse Business School;2. s.bourjade@esc‐toulouse.fr.;3. Toulouse School of Economics, IDEI, and GREMAQ;4. bruno.jullien@tse‐fr.eu. |
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Abstract: | We analyze situations in which an expert is biased toward some decision but cares also about his reputation in the market for experts. The information the expert reveals decreases as his bias moves toward stronger preferences for the status quo. Surprisingly, revealing the intensity of the expert’s bias does not always improve the information he reveals in equilibrium. The presence of a second expert raises the first expert’s incentives to report truthfully when the market can identify the contribution of each expert, but reduces them when only the collective contribution is identified by the market. |
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