Tax/subsidy policies toward vector-borne infectious diseases |
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Authors: | Mark Gersovitz Jeffrey S Hammer |
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Institution: | a Department of Economics, The Johns Hopkins University, Mergenthaler Hall, 3400 North Charles St., Baltimore, MD 21218, United States b The World Bank, United States |
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Abstract: | Vector-borne diseases especially rife in poor countries pose sectoral tax/subsidy issues. Preventions and therapies mitigate these diseases in a numerical optimization model combining dynamic epidemiology and economics. The medical distinction between prevention and therapy does not distinguish economic properties of preventions and therapies. Some interventions increase and others decrease moving to the steady state, depending: on the utility function, the targeting of interventions and the disease process. Interventions display negative own-price but indeterminate cross-price effects. Juxtaposing the social planner's with decentralized choices quantifies externalities and shows how subsidies implement the first-best. One prevention and the therapy are equally subsidized. |
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Keywords: | H41 I12 O15 |
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