Matching mechanisms and matching quality: Evidence from a top university in China |
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| Institution: | 1. Institute for Economic Analysis (CSIC) and Barcelona GSE, Campus UAB, 08193 Bellaterra (Barcelona), Spain;2. ISEG–UL, Universidade de Lisboa; REM–Research in Economics and Management; UECE–Research Unit on Complexity and Economics, Portugal;3. Departamento de Análisis Económico, Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (UNED), Paseo Senda del Rey 11, 28040 Madrid, Spain;1. Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Hindenburgufer 66, 24105 Kiel, Germany;2. Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, Department of Public Economics, Marstallplatz 1, 80539 Munich, Germany;3. WZB Berlin and Technical University Berlin, Reichpietschufer 50, 10785 Berlin, Germany;4. Department of Economics, University of Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200MD Maastricht, The Netherlands;1. School of Economics, Key Laboratory of Mathematical Economics, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, 111 Wu Chuan Road, Shanghai 200433, PR China;2. Department of Economics, Center for Experimental Social Science, New York University, 19 West 4th St., New York, NY, 100012, United States;1. Department of Economics, University of Exeter Business School, Rennes Drive, Exeter EX4 4PU, UK;2. Department of Economics, Brown University, 64 Waterman Street, Providence, RI 02912, USA |
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| Abstract: | We compare competing college admission matching mechanisms that differ in preference submission timing (pre-exam, post-exam but pre-score, or post-score) and in matching procedure (Boston (BOS) and serial dictatorship (SD) matching). Pre-exam submission asks students to submit college preferences before entrance exam scores are known, whereas post-score (post-exam) submission removes (reduces) score uncertainties. Theoretical analyses show that although mechanisms with post-score submission or SD matching are ex-post fair and efficient, they are not so ex-ante. Instead, the mechanism with pre-exam submission and BOS matching can be more fair and efficient ex-ante. These hypotheses are supported by empirical test on data from a top school at a top-ranked Chinese university with identification based on temporal and provincial changes. We find that although students admitted under the pre-exam BOS mechanism have lower college entrance exam scores than students admitted through other mechanisms on average, they exhibit similar or even better college academic performance. |
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| Keywords: | School choice Matching quality College admission Boston matching Serial dictatorship matching |
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