Drugs,guns, and targeted competition |
| |
| Institution: | 1. RBB Economics, Lange Houtstraat 37-39, 2511CV The Hague, The Netherlands;2. Department of Economics and International College of Economics and Finance, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Shabolovka 26, 119049, Moscow, Russia;1. Research Group in Economic Analysis, Facultade de Económicas, Universidade de Vigo, 36310, Vigo, Pontevedra, Spain;2. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and Barcelona Graduate School of Economics, Departament d''Economia i d''Història Econòmica, Campus UAB, Edifici B, 08193, Bellaterra, Barcelona, Spain;3. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis, Universidad Nacional de San Luis and CONICET, Ejército de los Andes 950, 5700, San Luis, Argentina;1. Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management, Technion – Israel Institute of Technology, Israel;2. Nuffield College and Department of Economics, University of Oxford, United Kingdom;1. Division of Global Public Health, University of California San Diego, San Diego, CA, USA;2. International Centre for Science in Drug Policy, Toronto, ON M5B 1W8, Canada;3. Global Commission on Drug Policy, Botafogo, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil;4. Urban Health Research Initiative, BC Centre for Excellence in HIV/AIDS, Vancouver, BC, Canada;5. Division of Brain Sciences, Imperial College London, London, UK;6. Department of Global Health, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands;7. British Columbia Centre for Excellence in HIV/AIDS, Vancouva, BC, Canada;8. Center for Drug Use and HIV Research, New York University College of Nursing, New York, NY, USA |
| |
| Abstract: | We consider a dynamic competition game involving three players, in which each player can vary the extent of his competition on a per-rival basis. We call such competition targeted. We show that if the players are myopic, then the weaker players eventually lose the game to their strongest rival. If instead the players are sufficiently far-sighted, then all three players converge in their power and stay in the game. We develop our model in application to drug wars, but the approach of targeted competition can be applied to competition between firms or political parties, or to warfare. |
| |
| Keywords: | Targeted competition Dynamic oligopoly Differential games Drug wars |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
