Mixed equilibria in runoff elections |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Chair of Restoration Ecology, Department Ecology and Ecosystem Management, Technische Universität München, Emil-Ramann-Straße 6, 85354 Freising, Germany;2. Institute of Integrative Nature Conservation Research, Department Integrative Biology and Biodiversity Research, Universität für Bodenkultur Wien, Gregor-Mendel-Straße 33, 1180 Vienna, Austria;1. Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Department of Management, San Giobbe, Cannaregio 873, 30121 Venezia, Italy;2. Nanyang Technological University, Division of Economics, 50 Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798, Singapore;1. CIDE, Mexico;2. Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México, Mexico;3. George Mason University, United States;4. California Institute of Technology, United States;1. New York University, Stern, United States;2. University of Maryland, United States;3. New York University, CESS, United States |
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| Abstract: | We demonstrate that the Hotelling–Downs model with runoff voting always admits symmetric mixed strategy equilibria for any (even or odd) number of office-motivated candidates (provided they are at least four). In specific, (a) we show that the game does not admit any symmetric atomless equilibrium, (b) we fully characterize a class of symmetric atomic mixed equilibria which exist for any distribution of the voters' ideal policies and (c) we argue that these equilibria are more robust than pure strategy equilibria to introduction of uncertainty about the voters' preferences. |
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| Keywords: | Runoff voting Mixed strategies Hotelling–Downs |
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