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Asymmetric parametric division rules
Affiliation:1. Research Group in Economic Analysis, Facultade de Económicas, Universidade de Vigo, 36310, Vigo, Pontevedra, Spain;2. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and Barcelona Graduate School of Economics, Departament d''Economia i d''Història Econòmica, Campus UAB, Edifici B, 08193, Bellaterra, Barcelona, Spain;3. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis, Universidad Nacional de San Luis and CONICET, Ejército de los Andes 950, 5700, San Luis, Argentina;1. Department of Economics, Shiv Nadar University, India;2. School of Management and Governance, Murdoch University, Australia;1. Microsoft Research, Herzliya, Israel;2. Department of Economics, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem 91905, Israel;3. Computer and Information Sciences, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA;1. Department of Economics, University of Exeter, Rennes Drive, Streatham Court, Exeter, EX4 4PU, UK;2. Department of Quantitative Economics, University Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands
Abstract:We describe and characterize the family of asymmetric parametric division rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims on a divisible homogeneous good. As part of the characterization, we present two novel axioms which restrict how a division rule indirectly allocates between different versions of the same claimant. We also show that such division rules can alternately be represented as the maximization of an additively separable social welfare function.
Keywords:Claims  Bankruptcy  Rationing  Fair allocation  Consistency  Intrapersonal consistency
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