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Asking questions
Institution:1. University of Heidelberg, Germany;2. University of Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute, The Netherlands;1. ICREA, Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Barcelona GSE, Spain;2. Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona and Barcelona GSE, Spain;3. University of Michigan, United States;1. University of Cologne, Department of Economics, Albertus-Magnus Platz, D-50923 Cologne, Germany;2. Department of Economics, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester CO4 3SQ, United Kingdom;1. Department of Pediatric Hematology and Immunology, West China Second University Hospital, Sichuan University. Key Laboratory of Birth Defects and Related Diseases of Women and Children (Sichuan University), Ministry of Education, Chengdu 610041, Sichuan, China;2. Department of Phymatology, Baoji Municipal Central Hospital, Baoji 721008, Shaanxi, China
Abstract:We examine a model of limited communication in which the seller is selling a single good to two potential buyers. In each of the finite number of periods the seller asks one of the two buyers a binary question. After the final answer, the allocation and the transfers are executed. The model sheds light on the communication protocols that arise in welfare maximizing mechanisms.
Keywords:Mechanism design  Limited communication  Welfare maximization
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