Imitation and the role of information in overcoming coordination failures |
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| Affiliation: | 1. University of Cologne, Department of Economics, Albertus-Magnus Platz, D-50923 Cologne, Germany;2. Department of Economics, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester CO4 3SQ, United Kingdom;1. University of Heidelberg, Germany;2. University of Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute, The Netherlands;1. Department of Government, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester CO4 3SQ, United Kingdom;2. Faculty of Engineering, Information and Systems, University of Tsukuba, 1-1-1 Tennodai, Tsukuba, Ibaraki 305-8573, Japan;3. WZB Berlin Social Science Center, Reichpietschufer 50, D-10785 Berlin, Germany;4. Department of Economics, University of Heidelberg, Bergheimer Str. 58, 69115 Heidelberg, Germany;1. ICREA, Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Barcelona GSE, Spain;2. Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona and Barcelona GSE, Spain;3. University of Michigan, United States |
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| Abstract: | We consider minimum-effort games played in an arbitrary network. For a family of imitation behavioral rules, including Imitate the Best and the Proportional Imitation Rule, we show that inefficient conventions arise independently of the interaction structure, if information is limited to the interaction neighborhoods. In the presence of information spillovers, we provide a condition on the network structure that guarantees the emergence of efficient conventions. In contrast, if this condition is violated we will observe inefficient conventions, even in the presence of information spillovers. |
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| Keywords: | Minimum effort games Local interactions Learning Imitation |
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