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Exclusive contracts when the incumbent can establish a direct retailer |
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| Authors: | Hiroshi Kitamura Misato Sato Koki Arai |
| Institution: | 1. Faculty of Economics, Kyoto Sangyo University, Motoyama, Kamigamo, Kita-ku, Kyoto, 603-8555, Japan 2. Graduate School of Economics, George Washington University, 2115 G street, NW Monroe Hall 340, Washington, DC, 20052, USA 3. Competition Policy Research Center, Japan Fair Trade Commission, 1-1-1, Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, 100-8987, Japan |
| Abstract: | This paper constructs a model of anticompetitive exclusive dealings with potential downstream competition. Unlike in previous studies, the incumbent can establish a direct retailer with some fixed payment and can offer an exclusive contract to a downstream buyer twice. We show that the existence of these two options helps the incumbent deter socially efficient entry and earn almost monopoly profits even in the absence of scale economies and downstream competition. |
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