Political Learning: The Neglected Precondition of Constitutional Reform |
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Authors: | Email author" target="_blank">Gerhard?WegnerEmail author |
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Institution: | (1) Faculty of Economics, Law and Social Sciences, Chair of Institutional Economics and Economic Policy, Erfurt University, Nordhäuser Str.63, 99089 Erfurt, Germany |
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Abstract: | This paper analyses the claim of constitutional economics that liberal economic policy requires far-reaching constitutional reform. The paper starts with a restatement of this claim and reinforces the rationale of the currently most influential variants of constitutional economics as represented by contractarian constitutional economics (Brennan, Buchanan), on the one hand, and Hayek s evolutionary theory, on the other. However, these constitutional proposals have shortcomings because the institutional preconditions of constitutional reform are not sufficiently reflected. Instead, I argue that, in face of economic crisis, a revision of in-period politics requires no more collective rationality than constitutional reform does. As a consequence, the introduction of new constitutional rules depends on political learning. The article concludes that constitutional rules in the sense of CPE can stabilise political learning but they cannot replace it. |
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Keywords: | learning constitutional reform |
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