One-sided private provision of public goods with implicit Lindahl pricing |
| |
Authors: | Volker Meier |
| |
Institution: | 1. Ifo Institute for Economic Research, and CESifo, University of Munich, Munich, Germany 2. Department of Economics, University of Munich, Schackstr. 4, 80539, Munich, Germany
|
| |
Abstract: | We consider a sequential game in which one player produces a public good and the other player can influence this decision by making an unconditional transfer. An efficient allocation requires the Lindahl property: the sum of the two (implicit) individual prices has to be equal to the resource cost of the public good. Under mild conditions this requires a personal price for the providing player that lies below half of the resource cost. These results can, for example, justify high marginal taxes on wages of secondary earners. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|