Renegotiation of Concession Contracts: A Theoretical Approach |
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Authors: | J. Luis Guasch Jean-Jacques Laffont Stéphane Straub |
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Affiliation: | 1. World Bank and University of California, San Diego, CA, USA 2. University of Toulouse (IDEI, GREMAQ, ARQADE), Place Anatole France, 31042, Toulouse Cedex, France 3. University of Southern California, Los Angles, CA, USA 4. University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK 5. School of Economics, University of Edinburgh William Robertson Building, 50 George Square, Edinburgh, EH8 9JY, UK
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Abstract: | We construct a regulation model in which renegotiation occurs due to the imperfect enforcement of concession contracts. This enables us to provide theoretical predictions for the impact, on the probability of renegotiation of a concession, of regulatory policy, institutional features, economic shocks and of several characteristics of the concession contracts themselves. |
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