规制合谋防范理论述评

规制合谋是制约规制有效性的重要原因。新规制经济学对规制合谋的治理思路：在激励契约设计上，强调以联盟激励约束来阻止代理人合谋；在组织形式变革上，以授权规制使监督人转变为剩余索取者，从而降低合谋效率；在规制机构设置上，通过多个规制机构之间的分权制衡以改善规制信息结构，增加合谋的交易成本；在动态规制中，强调规制者的承诺能力，避免重新谈判。

A Survey of Regulatory Collusion-Proof

Regulatory collusion is an important factor to restrict the validity of regulation. New regulatory economics provides the following innovative ideas to manage the regulatory collusion. As the collusion - proof contract design, it emphasizes to introduce coalition ineentive as the collusion - proof principle ; as the transformation of the organization form, it brings up the delegation in the specific regulatory organization; as the regulatory institutions settlement, it points out the importance of separation of power; during the dynamic regulation, regulator＇s commitment capacity is crucial to prevent collusion in the long term.