Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies |
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Authors: | Gaë l Giraud,C line Rochon |
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Affiliation: | Gaël Giraud,Céline Rochon, |
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Abstract: | We present a feasible strategic market mechanism with finitely many agents whose Nash, semi-strong Nash and coalition-proof Nash equilibria fully implement the Walrasian equilibria. We define a strategic equilibrium concept, called correlated semi-strong equilibrium, and show that the Walrasian equilibria can be implemented by these equilibria, and also by the coalition-proof correlated equilibria of our mechanism. We show that these two concepts, suitably modified with transfers, fully implement the Pareto optimal allocations. |
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Keywords: | Coalition-proofness Correlation Semi-strong equilibrium Implementation |
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