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信息透明度对公司过度投资与融资约束的影响研究
引用本文:张兴亮,夏成才.信息透明度对公司过度投资与融资约束的影响研究[J].经济与管理研究,2011(8).
作者姓名:张兴亮  夏成才
作者单位:1. 嘉兴学院商学院,嘉兴市,314001
2. 中南财经政法大学会计学院,武汉市,430223
摘    要:本文基于2002~2009年深交所上市公司的非平衡面板数据,验证了国有控制公司存在过度投资,而非国有控制公司既存在融资约束又存在过度投资.对于国有控制公司,信息透明度发挥了治理作用,显著减少了过度投资;然而由于政府干预而使其承担的社会性负担等原因,即使在透明度较高的公司中依然存在过度投资.信息透明度同样治理了非国有控制公司中的代理问题,高透明度的公司主要存在融资约束,而非过度投资;但因制度环境的制约,信息透明度的提高并没有显著降低这些公司受到的融资约束.

关 键 词:终极产权  信息透明度  政治关系  过度投资  融资约束

The Effect of Information Transparency on Over -investment and Financing Constraints
ZHANG Xing-liang,XIA Cheng-cai.The Effect of Information Transparency on Over -investment and Financing Constraints[J].Research on Economics and Management,2011(8).
Authors:ZHANG Xing-liang  XIA Cheng-cai
Institution:ZHANG Xing-liang~1,XIA Cheng-cai~2 (1.School of Business,Jiaxing University,Jiaxing 314001,2.School of Accounting,Zhongnan University of Economics and Law,Wuhan 430223)
Abstract:Basing on unbalanced panel data of listed companies from Shenzhen Stock Exchange during 2004 to 2009, this paper finds that there is over-investment in state-owned enterprises,and that there are both over-investment and financing constraints in non-state-owned enterprises.For state-owned enterprises,information transparency plays a role of governance which mitigates over-investment.Nevertheless,there is still over-investment even in highest transparent state-owned enterprises because of government intervent...
Keywords:Ultimate Ownership  Information Transparency  Political Connections  Over-investment  Financing Constraints  
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