退耕还林中的中央政府与地方政府最优激励合约

在对地方政府执行退耕还林政策的成本收益进行分析的基础上,文章运用Holmstrom和Milgrom(1991)提出的多项任务委托—代理模型的精神,构建了一个中央政府与地方政府之间的双重任务委托—代理模型,并将土地资源禀赋因子引入该模型中,形成了一个新的分析框架,据此对中央政府与地方政府在退耕还林工程实施过程中的最优激励合约作出了研究。结果表明,在设计激励合约时,中央政府应根据地区的土地资源禀赋、地方政府的Arrow-Pratt绝对风险规避度量、退耕还林实施绩效的变异性等因素确定地方政府的可变收益分配率,并让地方政府的收益与退耕还林的实施绩效直接挂钩。在此基础上,文章就提高地方政府执行退耕还林政策的积极性提出了一组政策建议。

The Optimal Incentive Contract between Central and Local Governments in the Grain-for-green Project:

Based on the cost benefit analysis on local governments implementing grain for green policy,this paper uses the Multi Task Principal Agent Model,which was put forward by Holmstrom and Milgrom in 1991,to set up a Double Task Principal Agent Model,and forms a new analytical framework of the optimal incentive contract between central and local governments through introduction of land resources endowment accordingly.The result shows that the central government should set a fluctuant benefit distribution ration for local governments according to land resources endowment in the area,the Arrow Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion of local governments,the variability of performance of the grain for green project,and so on.Moreover,it's very important to link the benefits of local governments with the performance of this project.Finally,it puts forward some policy suggestions to improve the positivity of local governments to implement relative policies.