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可信性、价值认证和投资银行声誉机制
引用本文:刘江会.可信性、价值认证和投资银行声誉机制[J].财经研究,2007,33(9):124-134.
作者姓名:刘江会
作者单位:上海师范大学,商学院,上海,200234
基金项目:上海市哲学社会科学基金项目(2005BJL008)
摘    要:文章认为由于"机会主义"和"善意错误"的存在,致使投资银行在价值认证中面临"可信性"问题。文章利用C-F模型,探讨了投资银行声誉对解决"可信性"问题的意义,并通过分析投资银行声誉与发行企业质量、IPO抑价和承销费用之间的关系,发现投资银行声誉机制具有"信号显示"、"价值发现"和"补偿激励"等重要功能。由于没有很好地解决可信性问题,投资银行声誉机制的这些功能在我国基本不存在,因此我国投资银行很难发挥价值认证作用,这是我国证券发行市场有效性不足的一个重要原因。

关 键 词:可信性  价值认证  声誉
文章编号:1001-9952(2007)09-0124-12
修稿时间:2007年6月27日

Creditability, Value Certification and Investment Bank's Reputation Mechanism
LIU Jiang-hui.Creditability, Value Certification and Investment Bank''''s Reputation Mechanism[J].The Study of Finance and Economics,2007,33(9):124-134.
Authors:LIU Jiang-hui
Abstract:As an important value certification agency,investment bank always meets creditability problem due to its opportunism and honest mistakes.Employing the C-F model,this paper investigates the effects of reputation on investment bank's creditability.By analyzing the relationships between investment bank's reputation and quality of issuing firm,IPO underprice and underwriting fee,it finds that investment bank's reputation mechanism has some important functions,such as signaling,value discovering and compensation incentive.However,in China these functions never exist owing to not resolving creditability problem.China's investment bank can't play the role of value certification,which may be a key reason for the inefficiency of China's security issuing market.
Keywords:creditability  value certification  reputation
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