Linear Inequality Methods to Enforce Partnerships under Uncertainty: An Overview |
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| Authors: | Claude d'Aspremont,Louis-André Gé rard-Varet |
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| Affiliation: | aCORE, Université Catholique de Louvain, 1348, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium;bGREQAM, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Vieille Charité, 13002, Marseille, France |
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| Abstract: | We review different (generic) conditions on stochastic outcome functions to enforce either efficient or nearly efficient partnerships. Their logical relationship is explored. Two kinds of conditions are considered. However, the property for an action profile to be “compatible” plays a crucial role in both kinds. Also, two kinds of enforcement mechanisms are considered: enforcement through utility transfers and enforcement through repetition.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D2, D7. |
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| Keywords: | mechanism design partnership team moral hazard folk theorem |
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