Contracts and Productive Information Gathering |
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| Authors: | Jacques Cré mer,Fahad Khalil,Jean-Charles Rochet |
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| Affiliation: | aCNRS, GREMAQ, IDEI, Université de Toulouse 1, 31042, Toulouse CEDEX, France;bDepartment of Economics, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, 98195;cInstitut Universitaire de France, GREMAQ, IDEI, 31042, Toulouse, CEDEX, France |
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| Abstract: | We modify a standard Baron–Myerson model by assuming that, instead of knowing the state of nature, the agent has to incur a cost γ to learn it. Under these conditions, the principal will offer contracts that, depending on the value of γ, try to induce the agent to gather or not to gather information. We study the tradeoffs that are involved.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D82, D83. |
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