Communication, Risk, and Efficiency in Games |
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Authors: | Andreas Blume |
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Institution: | Department of Economics, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, 52242-1000 |
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Abstract: | This paper uses curb sets to study the evolution of effective pre-play communication in games where a single communication round precedes a simultaneous-move, complete-information game. It is shown that the effectiveness of one-sided pre-play communication is inversely related to risk in the underlying game, and to the size of the message space. If messages have somea prioriinformation content, then multi-sided communication is more effective than one-sided communication; i.e., risk and the size of the message space play no role.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C72. |
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