首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     


Pro-competitive Price Beating Guarantees: Experimental Evidence
Authors:Enrique?Fatás,Nikolaos?Georgantzís  author-information"  >  author-information__contact u-icon-before"  >  mailto:georgant@eco.uji.es"   title="  georgant@eco.uji.es"   itemprop="  email"   data-track="  click"   data-track-action="  Email author"   data-track-label="  "  >Email author,Juan?A.?Má?ez,Gerardo?Sabater-Grande
Affiliation:(1) LEE/LINEEX and University of Valencia, Spain;(2) LEE/LINEEX and Department of Economics, University Jaume I of Castellón, Spain;(3) LEE/LINEEX and Department of Applied Economics II, University of Valencia, Spain;(4) LEE/LINEEX and Department of Economics, University Jaume I of Castellón, Spain
Abstract:We report experimental results on duopoly pricing with and without price beating guarantees (PBG). In two control treatments, price beating is either imposed as an industry-wide rule or offered as a business strategy. Our major finding is that when price beating guarantees are imposed as a rule or offered as an option, effective prices are equal to or lower than those in a baseline treatment in which price beating is forbidden. Also, when price beating is treated as a business strategy, less than 50% of subjects adopted the guarantee, suggesting that, subjects realize the pro-competitive effects of the guarantee.JEL Classifications: C91, L11.This revised version was published online in April 2005 with corrections to one of the authorsrsquo name and to the page numbering.
Keywords:experimental oligopolies  price beating guarantees
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号