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博弈论视角的我国证券承销商声誉机制研究
引用本文:陈同浩,滕春强. 博弈论视角的我国证券承销商声誉机制研究[J]. 价值工程, 2006, 25(11): 163-166
作者姓名:陈同浩  滕春强
作者单位:山东经济学院,济南,250014;山东经济学院,济南,250014
摘    要:本文在对声誉机制理论进行综述的基础上,从博弈论视角分析了证券承销商声誉机制发挥作用的条件和我国承销商声誉机制缺失的必然。针对我国目前证券市场上承销商声誉机制缺失的原因进行了剖析,进而提出了政策建议,以提高证券市场上承销商的质量。

关 键 词:证券承销商  声誉  博弈论
文章编号:1006-4311(2006)11-0163-04

The Security Underwriter Reputation in the Securities Market:View from Game Theory
Chen Tonghao,Teng Chunqiang. The Security Underwriter Reputation in the Securities Market:View from Game Theory[J]. Value Engineering, 2006, 25(11): 163-166
Authors:Chen Tonghao  Teng Chunqiang
Affiliation:Shandong Institute of Economics, Jinan 250014, China
Abstract:This paper expounds the reputation theory and analyzes the condition of underwriter playing the pair in securities market. Explains the reason of loss in underwriter reputation,Advances the measures to improve the quality of underwriters.
Keywords:security underwriter    reoutation    theory game
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