Corruption,workforce selection and mismatch in the public sector |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Bank of Italy, Structural Economic Analysis Directorate, Via Nazionale 91, 00184 Roma, Italy;2. Centre for the Analysis of Public Policies, University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, viale Berengario 51, 41121 Modena, Italy;3. Bank of Italy, Regional Economic Research Division, Palermo Branch, via Camillo Benso Conte di Cavour, 131/A, 90133 Palermo, Italy;1. University of Adelaide, Centre for Housing, Urban and Regional Planning (CHURP), The University of Adelaide, South Australia, 5005, Australia;2. Singapore University of Social Sciences, 463 Clementi Road, 599494, Singapore |
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| Abstract: | We examine the impact of corruption on workforce selection and personnel allocation in the public sector. Using Italian data, we find that the selection of public employees in terms of human capital worsens in comparison to that of their private sector counterparts in areas with higher levels of corruption. Moreover, corruption is associated with educational mismatch in the allocation of human resources and, in particular, with an increase in the rate of under-qualification. These results are robust to several alternative indicators and specifications, including IV estimation using past dependence on public spending and the historical relevance of foreign domination as exogenous sources of variation for current corruption. |
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| Keywords: | Corruption Selection Mismatch Schooling Human capital Public employment D73 H83 J45 |
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