首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     


Ex ante loss control by insurers: Public interest for higher profit
Authors:Harris Schlesinger  Emilio C. Venezian
Affiliation:(1) College of Commerce and Business Administration, The University of Alabama, 35487-0224 Tuscaloosa, AL, USA;(2) Wissenschaftszentrum, Berlin;(3) Rutgers University, 07104 Newark, New Jersey
Abstract:This article examines the incentives of an insurer to modify loss distributions prior to the sale of insurance. While actions such as lobbying Congress for mandatory airbags in automobiles are undertaken by insurers for the stated purpose of reducing the aggregate loss in society, they also change the nature of the risk being insured and, hence, affect the profitability of insurance sales. For the case of loss prevention (reducing the probabilty of a loss), insurers do not always have an incentive to invest in loss control. For loss reduction (reducing the severity of any loss that does occur), the incentive is to reduce the size of small losses while simultaneously increasing the size of large losses.Venezian Associates
Keywords:
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号