Nash implementation with a private good |
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Authors: | John Duggan |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Political Science and Department of Economics, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627, USA (e-mail: dugg@troi.cc.rochester.edu) , US |
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Abstract: | Summary. I construct a general model of social planning problems, including mixed production economies and regulatory problems with
negative externalities as special cases, and I give simple mechanisms for Nash implementation under three increasingly general
sets of assumptions. I first construct a continuous mechanism to implement the (constrained) Lindahl allocations of an economy,
and I then extend this to arbitrary social choice rules based on prices. I end with a mechani
sm to implement any monotonic social choice rule, assuming only the existence of a private (not necessarily transferable)
good. In that general case, each agent simply reports an upper contour set, an outcome, and I need two agents to make binary
numerical announcements. I do not require the usual no-veto-power condition.
Received: February 19, 1998; revised version: January 30, 2002 |
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Keywords: | and Phrases: Nash implementation Lindahl equilibrium Walrasian equilibrium Simple mechanisms |
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