Agency problems in tracking stock and minority carve-out decisions: Explaining the discrepancy in short- and long-term performances

Several studies have evaluated short- and long-term performances of parent firms who resort to restructuring via tracking stock or minority carve-out. Results show that short-term positive performance of restructuring parents turns negative in the long haul. Although researchers have attempted to resolve this inconsistency, a satisfactory explanation is yet to emerge. In this paper, we offer the self-serving behavior of restructuring parents’ managers as a potential explanation for the observed discrepancy in the short- and long-term performances. We argue that managers of parent firms create new units to receive additional compensation packages. We present evidence that the long-term negative performance can be attributed, at least partially, to self-awarded raise. Since managers of tracking stock parents enjoy a greater degree of managerial discretion and controls, we hypothesize that they would pay themselves a bigger compensation package than their carve-out counterparts and their long-term performance would be inferior to that of the latter group. Our results largely support these hypotheses.

Peihwang WeiEmail: