| 减少国有企业代理人腐败的激励契约分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 敬嵩,雷良海. 减少国有企业代理人腐败的激励契约分析[J]. 商业研究, 2006, 0(15): 48-51 |
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| 作者姓名： | 敬嵩 雷良海 |
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| 作者单位： | 上海理工大学,上海,200093 |
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| 摘 要： | 由于我国国有企业独特的委托—代理关系和其所处的独特政策环境,国有企业的腐败时有发生。解决腐败问题可以从制度安排上着手,也可以从委托代理契约设计着手。从委托人的角度论证良好的契约激励设计将促使委托人加强监督,减少代理人腐败;从代理人角度论证加大激励将减少代理人参与腐败的动机。
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| 关 键 词： | 委托代理 腐败 监督 激励 股票期权 |
| 文章编号： | 1001-148X（2006）15-0048-03 |
| 收稿时间： | 2005-09-02 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005-09-02 |
The Analysis of Contract to Reduce State-owned Enterprise Agent Corruption |
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| JING Song,LEI Liang-hai. The Analysis of Contract to Reduce State-owned Enterprise Agent Corruption[J]. Commercial Research, 2006, 0(15): 48-51 |
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| Authors: | JING Song LEI Liang-hai |
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| Affiliation: | Management school, Shanghai University for Science and Technology, Shanghai 200093, China |
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| Abstract: | China state-owned enterprises are face up with serious corruption problems with special principle-agent chain and policy environment.The paper analyzes the incentive contract that can better prompt principal to enhance supervision and agent to reduce corruption. |
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| Keywords: | principal-agent corruption supervision incentive |
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