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上市公司股权激励机制与政策思考
引用本文:周昌仕.上市公司股权激励机制与政策思考[J].财会通讯,2007(8).
作者姓名:周昌仕
作者单位:暨南大学管理学院 广东广州
摘    要:高级管理层股权激励是西方企业缓解代理冲突的重要的风险激励机制,但我国对管理层股权激励的作用还缺乏清晰的认识。本文对中外管理层股权激励的理论和经验进行比较分析后发现,我国上市公司管理层持股已从单纯的福利制度安排向激励制度安排过渡。基于此,公司应尊重内生性,以长效考核机制为基础推行适度的股权激励计划,但要注意降低股权激励过程中新的代理成本和防止股权激励后的“内部人交易“。

关 键 词:管理层持股  激励制度安排  内生性  新代理成本  内部人交易

Ananalysis of Equity Incentive Mechanism and Current Policies
Zhou Changshi.Ananalysis of Equity Incentive Mechanism and Current Policies[J].Communication of Finance and Accounting,2007(8).
Authors:Zhou Changshi
Abstract:Managerial ownership is an important kind of risk incentive to reduce agency conflict.Though research conclusions are different,most evidence indicates managerial ownership is related to firm value.Equity incentive helps to decrease agency costs and increase firm value.Moreover,firm value has important effect on managerial ownership.To a certain extent,managerial ownership is endogenous for firm value.The research concludes the managerial ownership has changed from single welfare institutional arrangement to incentive institutional arrangement,and argues some current policies.
Keywords:Managerial ownership Incentive institutional arrangement Endogeneity New agency cost Internal transaction
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