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Input Prices as Signals of Costs to a Downstream Rival and Customer
Authors:Pei‐Cheng Liao
Institution:National Taiwan University
Abstract:We consider a dual distribution channel in which a vertically integrated manufacturer competes with a downstream rival in a retail market and also sells an input to the rival. We use a signalling model with a continuum of types to examine a situation in which the manufacturer has private information on the production cost of its retail product. We show that in a separating equilibrium under Cournot (Bertrand) retail competition, the manufacturer signals the uncompetitiveness (competitiveness) of its firm by charging a smaller input price than the optimal price under complete information.
Keywords:D43  D82  L13
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